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To Claim or Not to Claim: Estimating Non-Take-Up of Social 
Assistance in Germany and the Role of Measurement Error 
 




Using representative micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for 
the year 2002, we analyse non-take-up behaviour of Social Assistance (SA) in Germany. 
According to our simulation as much as 67 percent of the eligible population did not claim SA 
in that year which is slightly higher than reported in previous work. We particularly empha-
size the role of measurement error in estimating non-take-up. First, we consider misspecifica-
tions of the simulation model due, e.g., to households claiming to have received SA although 
not simulated as eligible (“beta-error”). Second, we employ sensitivity analyses revealing the 
impact of measurement errors in reported household income and wealth as well as in simu-
lated needs. Misreported household incomes appear to have the greatest impact on the esti-
mated non-take-up rates, as shown in Monte-Carlo-type simulations. Regression analysis of 
the potential determinants of non-take-up behaviour confirm that rational motives – i.e., the 
expected net utility from claiming – as well as stigma and other barriers play a crucial role in 
explaining the puzzle of large non-take-up rates of SA. 
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1 Introduction 
Means-tested social benefits targeted at the very poor are a pillar of modern welfare states. As 
a “last safety net,” they are designed to ensure every member of society the possibility to 
participate, at least at a minimum level. However, recent literature provides evidence that a 
substantial number of people do not claim the social benefits they are eligible for. Reviewing 
the international literature, van Oorschot (1991, 1998) finds that non-take-up is at least 20% 
in all countries observed and even higher in many cases, depending on the type of benefit. For 
Germany, recent studies of non-take-up of social assistance estimated non-take-up rates rang-
ing from 43.3% (Wilde/Kubis 2005) to 63.1% (Kayser/Frick 2001; see also Riphahn 2001 and 
Becker/Hauser 2005). In other words, means-tested social benefits seem to fail the goal of 
providing the whole population with a minimum of resources needed to participate in social 
life, which can be interpreted as a lack of welfare state efficiency. 
Still, the understanding of the empirical finding of high non-take-up rates is a puzzle. In line 
with economic theory, it is usually taken for granted in social policy that individuals will 
maximise their profits from any relationship with the welfare state. Preoccupied by the idea of 
rational, profit-seeking individuals, social policy has been much more concerned with misuse 
and over-consumption of social benefits, thus widely neglecting or playing down the problem 
of under-consumption (van Oorschot 1998: 101f.). Yet, empirical investigations have pro-
vided evidence that non-take-up is a serious problem of social policy, related – among other 
factors – to stigmatisation, information deficits and complex claiming schemes. Especially in 
the case of benefits targeted at the very poor aimed at maintaining minimum living standards 
– which are at the focus of this paper – non-take-up points to a severe failure of the social 
security system. 
In recent years, the scope and determinants of non-take-up of social assistance has become an 
important issue in social policy related research. This is most important for micro-simulation 
models focussing on the evaluation of social policy reforms that often implicitly assume a 
complete take-up of social benefits, i.e., a non-take-up rate of zero percent. Also, monitoring 
trends in poverty and social exclusion by analysing the population of social benefit recipients 
might be misleading if non-take-up is not accounted for, resulting in a significant underesti-
mation of the population in need and even arriving at wrong conclusions if trends in non-take-1 Introduction 
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up counteract the observed trends in take-up (see Kayser/Frick 2001: 28 and Riphahn 2001: 
379 for more arguments on the relevance of non-take-up). 
In this paper we estimate the incidence and the potential determinants of non-take-up of social 
assistance in Germany for the year 2002. However, empirical estimation of non-take-up rates 
is a difficult enterprise. The simulation of eligibility depends heavily on the scope and quality 
of the available data. Even if perfect information were available – at least the same informa-
tion that social assistance agencies request from their claimants – the decision on eligibility is 
still at the discretion of the social assistant agency, leaving room for individual judgements by 
the social administrator. But most important, the information available in the survey data may 
not cover the complete information required in the claiming process, and the information 
available is most likely afflicted with measurement error.  
Therefore, in this paper the scope and relevance of measurement error will be addressed in 
detail at the various stages in the simulation process. We provide different measures of non-
take-up rates arising from modifications of the simulation model and its inherent decisions, 
and we address the impact of measurement error in the information on incomes and needs by 
means of sensitivity analysis. For our analyses, we use micro-data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) that provides us with a wide range of relevant information. All 
information on needs, housing costs, incomes and social assistance receipt refer to the same 
point in time: the month of the interview. Moreover, and in addition to previous literature on 
non-take-up of social assistance in Germany, we are able to draw on detailed personal infor-
mation on wealth and assets collected in the survey year 2002. This allows us to consider 
wealth and assets according to the subsidiarity rule implemented in the underlying means 
testing schemes.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of the social as-
sistance scheme and the development of social assistance in Germany since the 1980s. In 
Section 3 we discuss the previous literature on the incidence of non-take-up of SA in Ger-
many by means of various data sources as well as explanatory models on non-take-up behav-
iour. The reference simulation model of eligibility for social assistance is developed in Sec-
tion 4, while Section 5 provides an in-depth discussion of quality problems and alternative 
specifications of the simulation model, and the identification of non-take-up households. In 
Section 6 we provide regression analyses on non-take-up behaviour, and Section 7 concludes. 2 Social Assistance in Germany 
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2  Social Assistance in Germany 
In Germany, like in many other European countries, the social security system relies heavily 
on social insurance schemes that are upstream of means-tested benefits like housing benefits 
or social assistance (SA). Within the social security system, SA operates as a last-resort safety 
net. It is aimed at “enabling to the receipt to live a life consistent with human dignity. The aid 
should, as far as possible, enable the recipient to live without it, and the recipient must con-
tribute his/her utmost to achieving this.” (§1 BSHG, authors’ translation). According to the 
principle of subsidiarity, a person is eligible for SA only if all other means of making ends 
meet have been exhausted. This includes all incomes and downstream benefits as well as the 
consumption of personal assets and wealth as well as labour market activity.  
The SA system, as of 2002, offers two main types of benefits:  
•  The first type of benefit provides regular support to cover living expenses (Hilfe zum 
laufenden Lebensunterhalt, HLU) to households that would otherwise be unable to main-
tain minimum living standards. It provides monthly payments, and for unemployed but 
employable persons, also offers assistance in finding a new job (Hilfe zur Arbeit).1 The 
regular subsidization of living expenses for non-institutionalized recipients, who are the 
focus of this study, will be described in more detail in the following sections and referred 
to as “regular SA”.  
•  The second type of benefit provides support covering additional living expenses in special 
situations (Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen, HbL). It is targeted at households facing spe-
cial circumstances whose extra costs require temporary or prolonged financial support. The 
most important special SA of this type is aid for the rehabilitation and reintegration of dis-
abled persons into the working world. Special SA also covers nursing care, aid to young 
families, blind persons, etc.  
•  The third type provides one-time benefits (Einmalige Hilfen zum Lebensunterhalt) as fi-
nancial stand-alone funding for goods and services that are needed but are either not cov-
ered by regular SA payments or too costly for low-income budgets. This type of benefit is 
usually given to households already receiving SA, but could also be given to other house-
                                                                          
1 As of the reference year of this study, 2002, the support for labour market reintegration operates separately from 
the official labour offices at the level of the local authority. The recent labour market reforms (“Hartz” Acts) aimed 
to overcome this double structure by unifying the former labour market activities of the SA agencies with those of 
the labour offices. However, these new regulations are ignored in this paper.  2 Social Assistance in Germany 
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holds. Roughly approximated, it accounts for as much as ten percent of regular SA pay-
ments (Becker/Hauser 2005: 54). However, given that this kind of benefit is conditional on 
passing the means test for HLU and is paid on top of the regular payments, it will not be 
considered in the simulation of eligibility. 
The SA system in Germany dates back to the social assistance act of 1962 (Bundessozialhilfe-
gesetz, BSHG). At the time of initial implementation, poverty was in sharp decline compared 
to high post-war poverty in Germany, and was expected to decline further. The political deci-
sion makers who drafted the social assistance act (BSHG) explicitly stated that the most im-
portant part of the new SA system would be the benefits for special living conditions (HbL). 
The largest group of long-term recipients of regular SA were older women, mostly widows, 
who had lost their husbands in World War II and were otherwise receiving no or inadequate 
old age pensions (Hauser et al. 1981: 75ff.). In light of the economic prosperity and full em-
ployment that continued over the 1960s, it was expected that the population in need of longer-
lasting support would steadily decline. In this period, the thresholds defining basic needs for 
living expenses (Eckregelsätze) were also constantly rising in line with the rising living stan-
dards.  
Over the course of the 1970s this development did an about-face. In contrast to the short re-
cession of 1967, mass unemployment did not recover after the 1973 oil shock and could not 
be reduced to its former level of full employment. In 1981, unemployment rates again in-
creased sharply to more than 9% and could not be reduced thereafter. Along with this gradual 
increase in mass unemployment, income inequality and poverty as well as the population 
share of SA recipients continuously increased over the 1980s and 1990s (Becker/Hauser 
2003; Frick et al. 2005). Contrary to the initial expectations, the overall raise in SA recipients 
was driven entirely by the increase in the number of regular SA recipients, whereas the rates 
of recipients of benefits for special living conditions (HbL) remained almost unchanged. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows this increase in the number of recipients as well as total expenditures for regu-
lar SA. 2 Social Assistance in Germany 
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Figure 2-1: 
Recipients and Expenditures of Regular SA in Germany, 1980-2004 
Note: Expenditures for SA are gross total expenditures for HLU.  
Source: StaBuA 2003 (Tab. A5.1 and B4) 
Expenditures on SA increased from €2.2 billion in 1980 to almost €10 billion in the late 
1990s, and over the same period, the number of regular SA recipients increased from 850 
thousand to nearly three million. However, this increase would have been much greater if 
there had been no attempts to cap it. These attempts included refraining from adjusting the 
basic rates of SA and the introduction of more restrictive conditions for eligibility, such as 
workfare programs combined with stronger sanctions of rejections of workfare programs 
(Semrau 1990: 112; Hauser/Hübinger 1993: 50ff.; Adamy/Steffen 1998: 34-52; 
Becker/Hauser 2005: 49f.). Another important change in the institutional setting was the ex-
clusion of whole groups of potential beneficiaries. In 1993, asylum seekers were excluded 
from the eligible population and a new kind of benefit scheme was introduced for them 
(AsylbLG), which is below the minimum level established by regular SA. In 1994, when the 
“care insurance” (Pflegeversicherung) was introduced as a new component of the social in-
surance system, many elderly recipients of SA – many of whom were, until then, receiving 
aid for special living conditions – also began receiving upstream social benefits. The rise in 
the SA budget over the last two decades was accompanied by a structural change of the popu-
lation in need. Whereas the receipt of benefits declined steadily among the elderly, the corre-
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by single-parent households and by foreigners and immigrants (Hauser/Hübinger 1993: 55ff.), 
with the latter being most severely affected by the massive unemployment due to the lack of 
additional means of compensation (e.g. capital income).  
As such, the main pressure on the social security system came from the return of mass unem-
ployment. Of course, there are other social benefits designed to protect households against 
unemployment. One is unemployment insurance, which is based on contributions by the em-
ployed, and another is unemployment assistance, which is a means-tested benefit financed by 
taxes. However, these benefits, which are upstream to SA, failed to absorb the increasing 
numbers of unemployed people and were subjected to increasing restrictions in terms of eligi-
bility conditions, benefit amounts, and maximal duration of receipt. Thus, the German SA 
became a kind of permanent de facto basic income for huge numbers of needy people al-
though initially designed only as a means of temporary aid.2  
3  Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research 
Questions 
3.1  Incidence of Non-Take-Up in Germany – Trends over Time and 
Comparability Problems 
A few studies have addressed non-take-up of SA in Germany. The overall focus of these stud-
ies has been on the incidence of non-take-up rates of SA and descriptive estimates of non-
take-up rates for various subgroups of the population such as the elderly or families with 
young children. Compared to other countries, non-take-up rates seem to be quite high in Ger-
many, in particularly if more recent studies are considered. The continuous but still sparse 
literature on non-take-up of SA in Germany allows at least some suggestions about its devel-
opment over time. An overview of the estimated non-take-up rates is given in figure 3-1. 
However, it has to be noted that comparability among these studies and their results is ham-
pered by the use of different data sources as well as different simulation models. Concerning 
                                                                          
2 Since 2002 there have been reforms of the social security system in Germany, but these are beyond the scope 
of this paper. For example, in 2003, a basic income for the elderly was introduced, not least to reduce the high 
stigma costs and other barriers to taking up SA for this group of the population. Finally, in 2005 the so called 
“Hartz” reforms led to a realignment of the social security system by unifying all labour market related activities (at 
so-called job centres) as well as all benefits for employable persons to the new unemployment assistance type II 
(ALG II). These changes actually left only persons out of workforce at the focus of the rearranged “social assis-
tance” system. See Becker (2007) for a first analysis of non-take-up of the new designed unemployment benefit 
(ALG II). 3 Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research Questions 
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the population covered, the data set most often employed, the German Income and Consump-
tion Survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) which is a quota sample of 
households with top-capped incomes, is also not representative for the overall population, in 
that foreigners and immigrants are highly mis- and underrepresented. A correct representation 
of this group is very important given that migrants tend to be overrepresented among SA 
recipients, not because they differ from natives with respect to their take-up behaviour but just 
because of above-average eligibility (Castranova et al. 2001). While older studies using data 
up to 1990 focused solely on West Germany, some recent studies include or focus mainly on 
East Germany and others do not. Although incomes in East Germany are considerably lower 
than in the western states, non-take-up of SA has been found to be higher in the East during 
the 1990s when the West German SA system had just been introduced, with some regional 
adjustments for East Germany, and was still a novelty there. Easterners knew less on average 
about claiming procedures, had higher information barriers as well as higher stigmatisation 
due to the history of social security benefits in the GDR. 
Figure 3-1: 
Non-Take-Up Rates for Germany 
Hauser et al. (1981) and Semrau (1990) provided consistent time series estimates of non-take-
up rates based on EVS data showing a monotonic decrease in non-take-up during the 1960s 
and 1970s. However, more recent studies based on various data sets show significantly higher 
rates of non-take-up for the 1990s. Due to the lack of consistent time series analysis for the 3 Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research Questions 
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time period spanning the 1980s, one can only speculate that non-take-up rates increased again 
in line with the overall U-shaped pattern of poverty rates in post-war Germany (see above, 
section 2) although there appear to be some endogeneity problems due to rising poverty rates 
induced by (increasing) non-take-up of SA.3 
Given the substantial differences in estimated non-take-up rates and the unclear picture across 
time, differences in the simulation model – due to the different information available in dif-
ferent data sets – have gained a great deal of attention in the recent literature (Wilde/Kubis 
2005; Becker/Hauser 2005). Becker and Hauser (2005) provided a comparative analysis on 
non-take-up of SA based on the three most important survey data sets for Germany: EVS, 
SOEP and NIEP (a panel study of low-income households, Niedrigeinkommenspanel (Kort-
mann et al. 2003)). They worked out a “basic simulation model” that could be applied almost 
identically to the three data sets, in order to derive estimates of non-take-up that mainly reflect 
differences in the sample selection and data quality of the three surveys. And in fact, non-
take-up rates differed markedly, ranging from 55% for NIEP to 66% for EVS, with the SOEP 
showing an intermediate rate of 61%. In a second step, Hauser and Becker developed differ-
ent simulation models for each data set in order to fully exploit the available information. 
Resulting from this, the rates of non-take-up, which declined overall due to an improved 
simulation of wealth holdings, were much closer, ranging from 45% (EVS) and 46% (NIEP) 
to 50% (SOEP).  
Thus, adapting simulation models to the peculiarities of the data set will result in more reli-
able measures of non-take-up rates than trying to stipulate a standardised but rather general 
and rough simulation model on the data. One of the most crucial parameters in a simulation 
model affecting the measurement of non-take-up is whether and how wealth and assets are 
taken into account. Table 3-2 shows the impact of considering such wealth controls in the 
eligibility simulation as reported by Riphahn (2001), Wilde/Kubis (2005) and Becker/Hauser 
(2005) in their different studies. As can be seen, the estimated rate of non-take-up decreases 
by almost 20% once wealth is controlled for. 
                                                                          
3 The strong decline of non-take-up rates estimated by Neumann and Hertz (1998) between 1991 and 1995 is 
questionable for methodological reasons, since for example non-take-up rates are estimated comparing eligibility 
in the SOEP micro data with SA rates derived from official statistics. However, a declining trend of non-take-up 
between 1995 and 1998 might also be in line with a decline in poverty rates, following the labour market fluctua-
tions during this period following the German unification boom of the early 19902. Also, time series analyses 
provided by Becker and Hauser (2005) for the years 1993, 1998 and 2003 show a minor decline of non-take-up 
rates from 48% to 45%, but a further increase to 51% thereafter. 3 Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research Questions 
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Table 3-2: 
Impact of Wealth Control on Non-Take-Up Rates 
Study dataset  (year) 
non-take-up prior 
to wealth control 
non-take-up after 
wealth control 
reduction in % 
 
Riphahn 2001  EVS (1993)  76,8  62,6  18,5 
Wilde/Kubis 2005  NIEP (1999)  54,5 43,3 20,6 
Becker/Hauser 2005  EVS (1998)  65,7  47,5  27,7 
  SOEP  (1998)  61,4 49,1 20,0 
  NIEP  (1999)  55,4 49,6 10,5 
 
However, substantial differences in the estimated non-take-up rates remain constant across the 
studies.4 Also, non-take-up rates may still remain remarkably high even after controlling for 
wealth, as shown by Riphahn (2001) based on EVS data for 1993 and by Kayser and Frick 
(2001) based on SOEP data for 1995, who are both reporting a non-take-up rate of about 63% 
after considering wealth in the simulation model. Thus, differences in the reported non-take-
up rates cannot be attributed to different considerations of wealth, as suggested by Wilde and 
Kubis (2005). 
Summing up the results of these extremely diverse but broadly comparable previous studies 
suggests that over the last twenty years, non-take-up rates of SA in Germany have generally 
followed the overall U-shaped development of poverty rates. However, this conclusion still 
lacks detailed empirical substantiation through consistent time series analysis and should thus 
be taken with caution. But if it is true, it would contribute to the discussion about determi-
nants and causes of non-take-up, pointing to the importance of macro-level factors that might 
affect the structure of needs as well as the collective perceptions and attitudes towards SA, 
which certainly affect the stigmas attached to receiving SA. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature, not only by providing estimates of non-take-
up for a more recent point in time, but also by focusing on the role of measurement error in 
simulating eligibility and estimating non-take-up. Although the recent literature has begun to 
examine the impact of alternative specifications of the simulation model on non-take-up rates 
(see Riphahn 2001; Kayser/Frick 2001; Wilde/Kubis 2005; Becker/Hauser 2005), the sensi-
tivity analysis and robustness checks on data quality are still incomplete. In particular, the 
phenomenon of a “beta error” has been widely ignored – that is, the ratio of households re-
                                                                          
4 Another important parameter in the simulation models that highly affects non-take-up rates which has not re-
ceived much attention in the previous literature is the way housing costs are dealt with in the simulation model 
(see Kayser/Frick 2001: 36; Becker/Hauser 2005: 56ff., 61; see also below, section 4.2). 3 Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research Questions 
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porting SA receipt but being simulated as non-eligible – which also gives indications about 
the quality of the simulation model. Furthermore, issues of measurement error in survey in-
formation on income and needs are also widely neglected in the literature so far. Notable 
exceptions include Duclos (1995) and more recently Hernandez/Pudney (2007).  
3.2  Determinants of Non-Take-Up Behaviour 
Explanations for the high non-take-up rates of SA found in Germany have been proposed in 
detailed studies based on standardised or even narrative interviews with smaller samples 
(Hartmann 1991; Hübinger/Neumann 1997). Only a few studies have tried to analyse the 
determinants of non-take-up by means of regression analysis based on survey data (Riphahn 
2001; Kayser/Frick 2001; Wilde/Kubis 2005). As with the international literature, these 
analyses are mainly rooted in a rational choice framework, attempting to model non-take-up 
behaviour as the result of balancing expected benefits against the costs of claiming SA. 
The evidence provided by early studies of non-take-up – in Germany as well as elsewhere – 
can be summed up in the words of the Supplementary Benefit Commission as cited in van 
Oorschot (1998: 114): “… [R]eluctance to claim appears to come from some mixture of 
pride, ignorance, a sense of stigma, reluctance to make the efforts which a claim calls for, a 
desire for self-sufficiency on the part of an individual or family, an unwillingness to become 
involved with a government agency and a feeling that the whole business is not worthwhile.” 
(SBC 1978: 7)  
A first breakthrough to a more systematic understanding of the causes of non-take-up behav-
iour was brought about by “threshold” model first proposed by Kerr (1983). In his model, the 
decision to claim or not to claim a given social benefit depends on six stages or “thresholds” 
of the decision-making process that have to be made prior to a claim. The failure to pass at 
any one of the thresholds would result in not claiming the benefit at all. Kerr’s six thresholds 
were the following: (1) perceiving a need, (2) becoming aware of the existence of a benefit, 
(3) having a self-perception of eligibility, (4) considering the benefit useful in meeting one’s 
needs, (5) judging the benefit as positive and overall in line with one’s attitudes, and (6) being 
in a stable position of need. Kerr’s model has been criticised as modelling the decision proc-
ess too restrictively with respect to the strict sequential ordering, as well as for being incom-
plete, for example, with regard to the importance of time and triggers that may induce take-up 
behaviour, or the importance of strong negative attitudes towards social benefits that might 3 Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research Questions 
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block the decision process in very early stages (see van Oorschot 1998: 115f. for a more de-
tailed review).  
Building on this critique and on modifications of Kerr’s model, van Oorschot (1998) provides 
a more comprehensive explanation of non-take-up that also enlarges the model by taking into 
account the administrative and benefit levels rather than attributing the causes for non-take-up 
solely to the clients’ behaviour. Van Oorschot’s model consists of only three stages that have 
to be passed sequentially, each of which entails more complex processes. The first stage is the 
“threshold” stage, at which the benefit has to become salient, which involves becoming aware 
of the existence of a benefit that might help in making ends meet. However, there are some 
factors that might prevent people from further investigation during the decision-making proc-
ess, such as strong attitudinal barriers against social benefits, or a very unstable situation en-
tailing periodic eligibility/ineligibility. At the second stage, the so-called “trade-off” stage, 
people that have passed the threshold stage will trade off factors promoting a claim (like the 
perception of longer-lasting needs, of utility and eligibility) and factors inhibiting a claim 
(like perceptions high time or stigma costs of claiming benefits). If the perceived utility from 
claiming exceeds the perceived costs of claiming, people will claim the benefits. Finally, van 
Oorschot adds a third stage to the process: the “application” stage. At this stage, claimants 
may still withdraw from the claiming process if, for example, they feel humiliated by the 
social agency or if they had overestimated the utility and/or underestimated the costs of claim-
ing. On the other hand, the claim might also be rejected on behalf of the social agency, what 
even might happen erroneously.  
The importance of this third “application” stage in explaining non-take-up may be increased 
further by recent social policy reforms introducing or strengthening workfare elements or case 
management regulations regarding social benefits. On the one hand, these policies usually 
intend to enhance non-monetary support for getting a job or for coping with the difficulties of 
everyday life, but on the other hand, they often involve stronger social controls and sanctions 
by the social agency. As a consequence, they may lead to higher rates of withdrawal from the 
claiming process. One of the most striking findings from the longitudinal analysis of SA was 
carried out in the city-state of Bremen in the 1990s. It showed a high rate of claimants with-
drawing from the claiming process for unknown reasons (according to the SA agency docu-
ments from legal processes). One explanation described this behaviour as a reaction to being 
offered workfare programs (Buhr 1995: 128). 3 Non-Take-Up of SA – Literature Review and Research Questions 
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The model offered by van Oorschot also draws attention to the timing of the claiming process, 
with the possibility of delays, triggers, interruptions, and starting over again, and explicitly 
allows for different paths or routes through the claiming process.  
However, given the restrictions of survey data that are not designed to measure and explain 
non-take-up in the first place, this theoretical model can only serve as a general guideline to 
derive hypotheses that can be tested within a multivariate regression framework. Using non-
take-up vs. take-up of social benefits as a binary outcome variable, conditional on a simula-
tion of eligibility, it is assumed that households will claim social benefits if the expected util-
ity from claiming exceeds the costs of claiming. In terms of the more comprehensive thresh-
old model of van Oorschot, only the second “application” stage is considered by such a re-
gression framework. Alternatively, it may also be interpreted as a simplification and unifica-
tion of the threshold model, assuming that the processes in the first and third stage of the 
claiming process can at least be approximated by including it in only one unique equation, 
where for example the inhibiting factors operating at the first stage of the von Oorschot model 
as well as the factors causing withdrawals from claiming at the third stage are jointly mod-
elled with stigma and other claiming costs operating at the second stage. Such a regression 
model can be estimated as: 
P(SA)* = a + bc * Xc + bu * Xu + e   with P(SA)=1 if P(SA)*≥p and P(SA)=0 if P(SA)*<p       (1), 
where P(SA)* denotes the unobserved probability of claiming (measured by the binary out-
come of receiving vs. not receiving SA, linked to P(SA)* via a threshold p), Xc denotes a 
vector of variables approximating the costs of claiming and Xu a vector of proxies for the 
expected utility from claiming, bc and bu the corresponding coefficients, a the constant and e a 
random error term. 
Indeed, all the various aspects that are relevant in determining non-take-up according to the 
theoretical model can only be measured by proxy information. This is at least how most of the 
literature on non-take-up proceeds. Since proxy information within surveys is limited, it often 
appears that a given variable serves as a proxy for different and maybe even divergent proc-
esses. Education, for example, might serve as a proxy for the individual’s capacity to deal 
with information costs, assuming that more highly educated household heads will have an 
easier time filling out the application forms and interacting with the social administrator (see 
Kayser/Frick 2001). At the same time, education might also serve as a proxy for the expected 
utility from claiming, assuming that more highly educated household heads will manage more 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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easily in finding a new job and thus in reducing the duration of needs (see Riphahn 2001). In 
other words, higher education serves as a proxy for both lower claiming costs and lower util-
ity from claiming (Bargain et al. 2007).  
So far, little attention has been focused on selection issues and the simultaneity of labour 
supply and take-up decisions. In a recent study of the German case, Wilde and Kubis (2005) 
criticise the previous literature for this lack and provide empirical evidence on simultaneous 
decision processes using a simultaneous two-equation model, one for labour supply and one 
for take-up of SA. Since the argument that (generous) social benefits will create disincentives 
for the poor to work is widespread and commonly used in social policy debates, it seems 
important to address this argument explicitly in studies of non-take-up of social benefits. 
Therefore, in this paper, the potential selection into eligibility will be controlled for by means 
of a Heckman selection model. 
4  Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
In this section we describe the simulation model for SA in Germany, based on the representa-
tive micro-data of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) collected in the survey year 2002. The 
SOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households that provides 
yearly information on all household members, consisting not only of Germans living in the 
old and new German federal states, but also foreigners and recent immigrants to Germany 
(Haisken-DeNew/Frick 2005; SOEP-Group 2001; Wagner et al 2007). The panel was started 
in 1984, and in 2002, there were over 12,000 households with more than 30,000 persons sam-
pled. For the purpose of studying non-take-up of SA, the SOEP provides monthly information 
on income, needs and housing costs, as well as a wide range of personal and behavioural 
characteristics that are of interest in assessing the determinants of non-take-up behaviour. 
Moreover, the 2002 SOEP questionnaire includes detailed personal information on wealth that 
has not been used in previous non-take-up studies based on SOEP data. 
The simulation model consists of the following steps: After (1) defining the analysis popula-
tion, we (2) define the needs, including housing costs, (3) define the allowable income, ac-
cording to the rules of SA, (4) for households with needs exceeding allowable income, we 
carry out further checks of properties and assets that have to be exhausted before claiming 
benefits according to the subsidiarity principle. Then (5) we make some brief remarks on 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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editing and imputation in case of missing information and (6) describe the final classification 
of households according to “take-up”, “non-take-up” and “beta error” households. 
Before describing the setup of the simulation model in more detail, we first present informa-
tion on the number of SA recipients and the amounts received according to the SOEP data as 
compared to official statistics (see Table 4.1). The number of households reporting receipt of 
SA is only somewhat above 50% of the number of needs units receiving regular SA by the 
end of the year 2002 according to official statistics. Nearly the same rate of coverage is ob-
tained comparing the aggregated benefit amount. This underestimation may stem from the 
fact that low-income households tend to be underrepresented in household surveys in general, 
which cannot be fully compensated for by weighting techniques. However, comparability of 
these two data sources is restricted by the fact that the figures from official statistics are based 
on the households’ claiming status as of 31 December 2002, when labour market conditions 
as well as the Christmas season may have led to above-average SA receipt. On the other hand, 
the SOEP micro data focuses on the month of the interview, which for about 70% of all sur-
veyed households is between January and March.  
Table 4-1: 
Receipt of Social Assistance in SOEP vs. Official Statistics  
   Recipients  
of Regular SA 
Amount  
of Regular SA 
Official Statistics  1,443 thousand needs units
(per 31 Dec. 2002) 
571 Mill. € 
 (mean per month in 2002)* 
SOEP  779 thousand households 
(in month of interview 2002) 
296 Mill. € 
 (in month of interview 2002) 
“coverage”  
(SOEP in % of Official Statistics)  54.0% 51.8% 
Source: StaBuA 2003 (Tab. A2.6.1); SOEP 2002 
4.1 Restricting  the  Population 
In Germany, all individuals are eligible for SA except of asylum seekers, for whom a separate 
benefit scheme was introduced in 1993 (in reaction to a major increase in the number of asy-
lum seekers during the early 1990s), as well as students and apprentices who are eligible for 
educational subsidies. For this reason, students enrolled at universities as well as any persons 
in training receiving educational benefits are excluded from the needs calculation in our simu-
lation model.  4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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We also restrict the population to individuals in private households only. Although the institu-
tionalised population – in addition to a large number of asylum seekers in special residences 
and students in student accommodations, this also comprises elderly people in nursing and 
retirement homes – is at least partly covered by the SOEP due to the follow-up concept, we 
have excluded them from our analysis. Whereas the first two aforementioned groups are not 
eligible for SA, the latter groups of elderly people mainly receive support for special living 
conditions (HbL), e.g., for nursing care. Thus, the likelihood of measurement error on the type 
and amount of SA, as well as on needs (incl. housing costs) and income is especially high for 
this population. 
Likewise in previous studies, one major restriction of the simulation model applied here is 
that the unit of the eligibility simulation is the household and not the needs unit as defined by 
the SA law. However, as reported by Becker and Hauser (2005: 243ff.), almost 90% of the 
recipients of SA live in households that comprise only one needs unit. In the other cases, 
needs units according to the SA law are subgroups of the household they reside in. For exam-
ple, parents may not be responsible for supporting children in the same household if over the 
age of 18 or if they have already started a family of their own but are still residing in the same 
household with the (grand-) parents. Although it would be possible to identify such needs 
units within survey households, information on SA receipt is only surveyed at the household 
level and thus cannot be attributed correctly to one of the needs units within the household.5  
As a consequence, only in the case of households comprising at least one needs unit eligible 
for SA and at least one needs unit not eligible for SA, we will either over- or underestimate 
the number of eligible individuals when judging the household as one entire needs unit. Obvi-
ously, this phenomenon is closely linked to what will be dealt with as “beta-error” in the fol-
lowing analyses. Given that the rate of non-take-up is calculated by dividing the number of 
eligible persons that do not report receipt of SA by the number of all persons eligible accord-
ing to our simulation procedure, we will subsequently over- or underestimate the rate of non-
take-up as well. In case of multiple needs units per household with all needs units being either 
eligible or non-eligible, however, simulation based on the entire household will result in cor-
rect classifications, although the estimated amount of SA might be wrong. 
                                                                          
5 Trying to identify needs units within households with SOEP data is somewhat tricky because the interrelation-
ship of the various household members is only given with respect to the relation to the household reference 
person, i.e., there exists no ego-centered relationship matrix. 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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Another source of misclassification of non-take-up comes from eligible individuals who claim 
SA but are denied it because they have rejected job offers from the SA agency. According to 
the principle of subsidiarity, individuals are obliged to fully exploit their work possibilities in 
order to remain eligible for SA. On these grounds, the SA agency is also entitled to test the 
willingness to work by offering its clients workfare programs. Rejection of such offers may 
lead to substantial cuts in SA payments and, in case of repeated rejections, even to reductions 
of SA to the absolute minimum required for survival (§§18-19, BSHG). However, these are 
probably rare exceptions. What appears more significant is that offers of workfare programs 
often lead to abstention from (further) SA claims by claimants themselves. As such, this is an 
important determinant of non-take-up behaviour. 
4.2  Defining Needs and Housing Costs 
Total needs under the SA scheme are composed, first, of regular needs defined on the basis of 
region-specific thresholds for single adults (Eckregelsatz) and adjusted to family composition 
by means of the BSHG equivalence scale. The household head is assigned the weight of 1, 
and the weights of all additional members of the needs unit are defined by age (0.5 for chil-
dren aged 0 to 7, 0.65 for children aged 8 to 14, 0.9 for children aged 15 to 18 and 0.8 for 
each additional adult). In principle, regional thresholds for a single adult vary across federal 
states and are adjusted every 1
st of July. During the first half of 2002 they range from €274 -
287 and from €279-294 for the second half of 2002. The thresholds are applied to the micro-
data according to the month of interview. 
Second, in addition to the regular needs, additional needs are considered for pregnant women 
(starting from week 12 of pregnancy), elderly people with walking impairments, disabled 
people receiving reintegration benefits or unable to work, and people in need of special diet. 
Except for the latter additional need of a special diet, where information is missing in SOEP, 
all other sources of additional needs can be identified or at least proxied by survey informa-
tion. For pregnancy, we used information on childbirth from the subsequent panel wave 2003 
– which, however, is missing for survey dropouts. Walking disabilities are approximated 
using information on the question whether the respondents are “severely” or “slightly” af-
fected by their health status when climbing the stairs. Persons are identified as unable to work 
if they report an official disability status of at least 30% reduction in their earnings capacity 
and if they are receiving some kind of pension (although younger than 65). Finally, disabled 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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persons with reintegration benefits are identified by a reported disability status of at least 30% 
and by being in training. Each additional need amounts to either 20% or 40% of the regular 
needs, but the aggregation of these may not exceed 100% of the regular needs of a given indi-
vidual.  
Needs are also defined by housing costs. In principle, the actual housing costs (including costs 
for heating) of SA recipients will be paid directly by the SA agency, but only up to an appro-
priate amount. This is dealt with differently for tenants and homeowners. In case of tenants 
with rents far higher than the typical local rent, the SA agency may request the claimants to 
move to another home in order to maintain eligibility. In the case of homeowners, housing 
costs (including interests, but excluding repayments) are also covered up to an appropriate 
amount and in cases of housing costs exceeding this amount, the SA agency might request 
that claimants sell the house. However, for these eventualities no clear-cut thresholds or well 
defined rules exist. In other words, the definition of the appropriate amount of housing costs 
is largely at the discretion of the SA agency. Therefore, a rough approximating rule has to be 
applied in the simulation process. Within the literature, it is usually assumed that the appro-
priate amount of housing costs can be derived from the corresponding thresholds for house-
holds receiving housing allowances (Becker/Hauser 2005; see also Kayser/Frick 2001). Hous-
ing benefits are calculated on the basis of well defined tables that distinguish by household 
size, age of the building, sanitary facilities and, most important, an official regional rent index 
that distinguishes among six rent levels. However, since SA is the last safety net and housing 
benefits are upstream benefits to SA, the eligibility threshold underlying housing benefits 
might be seen as too restrictive for approximating the respective thresholds of housing cost 
maximums within the framework of SA. In fact, housing benefits for recipients of SA are 
more generous than for households that receive housing allowances only. 
In simulating these housing costs, we applied maximum thresholds that were derived from 
regression analysis of actual rents (paid by non-subsidized renters in the dataset) on a set of 
covariates that include (the logarithm of) household size, the regional rent level and the year 
of construction. We assumed that the mean housing costs of actual rents for comparable types  
of houses are more suitable approximations of the thresholds that SA agencies might use in 
their decision-making. In fact, the resulting thresholds derived from the regression analysis 
are quite similar to those given by the official figures on housing allowances.  4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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Given the actual housing costs and the derived threshold of maximum acceptable housing 
costs, we applied three different rules in the simulation model. In our “reference simulation 
model”, we assume that the actual housing costs are covered by the SA agency only up to the 
maximum threshold. Thus, housing costs above the maximum thresholds are simply not con-
sidered in defining a given household’s needs. In a second, more restrictive simulation model, 
we assume that in case of housing costs exceeding the maximum threshold, the household 
will fail the eligibility criterion, since the SA agency will force the household to move to 
another house (or to sell the owner-occupied home) in order to become eligible for SA. In a 
third, more generous simulation, we assume that all housing costs, whatever they might 
amount to, are covered by the SA agency. These two alternative models, the restricted and the 
generous one, might serve as extreme scenarios, with the “true” eligibility decision some-
where in between. Whereas the reference simulation model of considering housing costs up to 
the maximum threshold provides a solid approximation of the true decision-making processes, 
at least at an aggregated level, it should be noted that in individual cases the SA agency has to 
decide between the alternatives of accepting and paying the entire amount of housing costs or 
rejecting the whole claim. 
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where RN defines regular needs (depending on age), AN defines additional needs (with a 
maximum of ANmax=1), T gives the regional thresholds for the federal state k the households 
resides, and HC defines housing costs (with a maximum of HCmax derived from regression 
analysis). 
4.3 Defining  Allowable  Income 
The total needs of a given needs unit are compared to the allowable income in order to decide 
whether the needs unit is eligible for SA. Allowable income includes all kinds of incomes 
except benefits for war victims and child-rearing benefits. Starting from this gross income 
several income allowances are deducted in order to obtain the allowable income. Deductions 
include taxes and social security contributions, income allowances for employed persons 
graded by disability status, and allowances for households with children. Furthermore, ex-4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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penses for old-age provision, contributions to private health insurance, as well as non-
obligatory private transfers can also be deducted if they seem appropriate to the SA agency.  
In simulating allowable income, we start from monthly net household income at the time of 
the interview as reported by the household head. However, if this self-reported monthly in-
come falls short of the computed sum of all individual incomes reported in the personal inter-
views with household members plus the household-level income components, the aggregated 
income measure is used instead of the income screener. In the net income measure, taxes and 
social security contributions are by definition not included, whereas SA payments are in-
cluded and thus of course have to be deducted. Whereas income allowances for employed 
persons6 and for children7 are quite well defined, we could only approximate further deduc-
tions for private insurance and transfers, again a decision that is at least partly at the discretion 
of the administrative agency. Thus, for robustness purposes, we derive a more restricted 
measure of allowable income, including only a standard set of well defined employment and 
child allowances, and a more comprehensive measure of allowable income that also includes 
approximations of further deductions. 
4.4  Applying the Subsidiarity Rule – Wealth Check 
In principle, any needs unit with an allowable income of less than its total needs is eligible for 
SA. However, according to the subsidiarity rule, further checks are necessary, controlling for 
whether the already demonstrated needs can be met by through other available resources. 
These checks consist of a screening of any kind of assets and properties, and of a check for 
whether there exist third persons that are responsible for (and able to) support the needs unit 
at hand. Again, these checks are highly at the discretion of the SA agency and therefore hard 
to simulate. For example, a car is, by law, considered property that has to be sold before being 
eligible for SA payments, unless there are clear reasons why the possession of a car is neces-
sary, e.g. to keep a job or because of a disability. However, in practice, this rule often seems 
to be interpreted to the advantage of the claimant (Becker/Hauser 2005: 60). For this reason, 
the possession of a car should not be considered a sufficient indicator of non-eligibility, even 
in cases where no employed or disabled persons live in the household.  
                                                                          
6 Employment allowances amount to 25% to 50% of earnings, depending on total labour income. In case of 
disability these rates vary from 30% to 80%. A minimum allowance of 30€ is given to any employed person. 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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However, as previous studies have shown, a final wealth check seems crucial for the simula-
tion model (see also above, section 3.1). For the survey year 2002, the SOEP contains per-
sonal information on different kinds of assets and real property that can be used to simulate a 
wealth check.8 We first calculated the sum of all financial, tangible and business assets and 
the net worth of other properties owned (gross worth of other properties minus possible debt 
on other properties). If these assets exceed the allowed exempt amounts (e.g. €1279 for the 
household head), the household is considered ineligible for SA according to the wealth check. 
Furthermore, we separately calculated total assets in kind for owner-occupied housing and life 
insurance, for which more generous but not clearly defined thresholds exist. We apply a rather 
high threshold obtained by multiplying the household’s exemption for financial and other 
assets by a factor of 20. In addition to direct personal wealth information, we also checked for 
income from capital, assuming that a household possesses financial assets above the exemp-
tion limit if it receives annual interest payments exceeding €250.  
The reduction of the number of households simulated as eligible due to the wealth check is 
given in figure 4.2. We simulated 645 households as being eligible for SA considering only 
the income and needs situation. Of these households, 146 were found to possess financial and 
other assets above the exemption limits. However, among them are six households that actu-
ally report receiving SA. After carefully checking all relevant available information on these 
households in a case-wise procedure, we found that receipt of SA was in fact plausible from 
the personal characteristics and the kind of assets possessed (e.g. single-parent households, 
elderly women). In other words, after simulating an individual case management process by 
the SA agency, we reclassified those six households as being eligible for SA.  
                                                                          
7 Child allowances are granted only for single children up to 18 years of age and amount to 10.25€ for the first 
child and 20.50€ for each additional child (in 2002). 
8 Furthermore, the SOEP household questionnaire regularly contains information on incomes from capital, which 




Source: SOEP 2002 (unweighted households) 
4.5  Dealing with Missing Information – Editing and Imputation 
In order to avoid losing observations and running into selectivity problems we imputed miss-
ing information whenever possible. For instance when calculating actual housing costs, we 
substituted missing information on heating costs for homeowners or missing information on 
actual rents for tenants by means of regression analysis (hot deck imputation). In cases of 
missing information on monthly net household income, we replaced this information by 1/12 
of the household’s annual post-government income variable (see Grabka 2007; Frick/Grabka 
2005).  
Most important, the available survey data may also lack information on the receipt of SA. In 
16 cases (with as many as 56 individuals living in the households), we imputed information 
on the amount of SA received by households reporting that they do receive SA payments, 
again within a regression framework. The filter question of whether or not the households 
received SA at the time of interview does not, as such, contain item non-response, since it is 
asked within a series of questions focusing on the receipt of various public transfers. At the 
end of this block of the questionnaire, however, there is a control question whether the house-
hold did not receive any of the benefits asked for. If this control question was not answered, 
we may also lack information on the general receipt of SA. We did not impute this (possibly) 
lacking information, but we checked for the possibility in cases of households that were simu-
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4.6  Identifying Non-Take-Up & “Beta Error” 
With valid information on total needs, including housing costs, allowable income and wealth, 
the eligibility condition can be summed up as the intersection of those households with in-
comes below needs and wealth below the exemption limit: 
Elig=1, if    max
1
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where, in addition to formula (2), AY denotes the allowable income of household j, W de-
notes total net worth of household j and Wmax the according exemption limit.  
Given the (simulated) eligibility, we can than cross-tabulate eligibility with (reported) SA 
receipt: 
Table 4-3: 
Cross-Tabulation of Eligibility and SA Receipt 
  SA receipt  no SA receipt 
eligible  (1) take-up  (2) non-take-up 
ineligible  (3) «beta error»  (4) ineligible 
 
From a perspective of benefit targeting, the diagonal cells (1) “take-up” and (4) “ineligible” 
households are not problematic. Households that do not report receipt of SA but are simulated 
as eligible constitute the group most interesting for this paper, i.e., (2) “non-take-up” house-
holds. Finally, we also find households that are simulated as not eligible for SA, but in fact do 
report receipt of SA. These households might be referred to as “over-consumption” of SA or 
as “misusing” the social security system. However, this interpretation is only valid if the 
strong assumption holds that our simulation of eligibility as well as the responses to the re-
ceipt of SA question are correct and, thus, that those households must have been underreport-
ing their income to the SA agency in order to become eligible for SA. We do not believe that 
these strong conditions can be met by our simulation of eligibility and by the information 
available on SA receipt. On these grounds – to be elaborated in more detail below – we prefer 
to label those households as (4) “beta error” households. 
What is problematic in applying the cross-classification of eligibility and SA receipt to our 
data is not only the uncertainty of the simulation model with respect to eligibility (given that 
information is somewhat incomplete and contaminated by measurement error), but also with 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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respect to the information on SA receipt. For the time of the interview, to which all other 
information refers, we only have information on the general receipt of some kind of SA 
within the household. In other words, we cannot distinguish between receipt of regular SA 
(HLU) and SA for special living conditions (HbL) for the time of interview. Data from the 
following panel wave (gathered in survey year 2003) contains more detailed retrospective 
information on the household receipt of regular SA (HLU), SA for special living conditions 
(HbL) and one-time supplements (or any combination thereof) during the calendar year 2002. 
Since this information is not at all available for dropouts between 2002 and 2003, and there 
might also be problems with changing household composition as well as recall errors, this 
data was not considered regularly in the classification algorithm. Rather, we assume that a 
general reporting of SA receipt for the time of interview does in fact indicate receipt of regu-
lar SA (HLU) at least for those households that are simulated as eligible.9  
However, in cases of “beta error”, i.e., households being simulated as ineligible although 
reporting receipt of SA, we consulted the detailed retrospective information on the types of 
SA benefit received, if at all available, and re-classified households as “ineligible” that solely 
reported the receipt of special SA (HbL). Furthermore, using additional information on SA 
receipt is only one of several checks that were performed in cases of beta errors. As already 
described above, we also corrected for “too restrictive” application of the wealth check (see 
section 4.4). Moreover, we also checked for too restrictive applications of the income testing, 
e.g., we corrected the eligibility simulation in cases of allowable incomes exceeding the needs 
threshold only by a small amount of up to €50. The same is done in cases of “beta error” 
households for which monthly net incomes were missing for the time of interview and im-
puted from yearly incomes.  
                                                                          
9 Note that in panel surveys, only individuals can be traced across time, whereas households might change or 
even dissolve. Thus, the use of retrospective information on SA receipt collected at the following wave of the 
panel is only possible for persons in stable households, i.e., those with unchanged composition in 2002 and 2003. 
In all other cases of persons leaving the household or new persons entering the household (except for newborn 
children), we cannot be sure that the information from the household questionnaire 2003 really applies to the 
situation of the reference person in 2002. Actually, more than 90% of the population lived in stable households 
from 2002 to 2003. Comparing actual receipt of SA with retrospective information yields rather little deviation, but 
the deviation is somewhat greater for households with unstable household composition. Almost all households 
that reported currently receiving SA in 2002 also did so retrospectively for 2002 – only for six persons with a 
changing household composition was the current report of SA in 2002 not “validated” by retrospective information. 
On the other hand, one-third of the persons that retrospectively reported receiving SA in 2002 did not report SA 
receipt at the time of interview in 2002. This might of course be due to temporary receipt of SA or intermittant SA 
receipt at the time of interview. However, this was true for more than 50% of all persons with unstable household 
compositions, and for only 30% of persons in stable households. 4 Simulating Eligibility – Data & Methods 
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All these “post-simulation corrections” of beta error households are based on the general 
assumption that the occurrence of beta errors is mainly due to incomplete or incorrect survey 
information, rather than indicating that these households reported true incomes and assets to 
the SOEP but misreported their true incomes and assets to the SA agency. Households ini-
tially classified as “beta error” might in fact either simply be “ineligible” households, if the 
information on SA receipt was wrong, or “take-up” households, if the eligibility simulation 
was wrong due to incomplete or incorrect data on incomes and wealth. 
Table 4.4 gives an overview of the corrections performed in cases of beta errors (upper panel). 
The sequence of these corrections is relevant since there are also cases with conflicting uncer-
tainties, e.g., beta error households with only wealth exceeding the exemption limits (but 
income below needs) and retrospective information indicating that only SA for special living 
conditions was received. Thus, the order of the corrections follows the ranking of data quality, 
with the information most likely to contain measurement error corrected first. 
Table 4-4: 
”Post Simulation Corrections” of Beta Error and Non-Take-Up Households 
corrections with  
respect to …  Description  new classifi-
cation 
no. of HH 
(persons)  
affected 
1. imputed income  re-classification as eligible if income was imputed  “take up”  1 (1)
2. receipt of SA  re-classification as no SA receipt if only HbL mentioned 
in retrospective information (only stable households) 
ineligible 3  (7)
3. wealth check  re-classified as eligible if income<needs (case-wise 
checking) 
“take up”  6 (11)
4. income testing  re-classified as eligible if income only slightly above 
needs 
“take up”  9 (21)
total number of corrected “beta error” households (persons)  19 (40)
5. “non-take-up”   “non-take-up” households in 2002 retrospectively report-
ing HLU receipt during 10-12 months of 2002 in the 
following panel wave 2003 (only stable households) 
“take up”  19 (48)
Source: SOEP 2002 (unweighted) 
As can be seen from the lower panel of Table 4.4, a final check with respect to the informa-
tion on SA receipt was also performed in cases of non-take-up households. Making use of the 
retrospective SA information only in correcting for beta error would obviously produce a bias. 
In order to re-classify a non-take-up household as take-up household, a rather strong criterion 
of minimally 10 months receipt of regular SA in 2002 is applied. Thus, in these cases, classi-
fying households as non-take-up would be misleading. Again, this correction is only per-
formed for persons in stable households.  5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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5  Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
In the following section, we (1) present descriptive results on non-take-up rates for our “refer-
ence simulation model” and (2) investigate the variation in non-take-up rates according to 
various modifications of the simulation model. In the next step (3), we analyse the impact of 
potential measurement errors in our measures of income and needs by applying flat rates of 
variation as well as random errors. 
5.1  Results for the “Reference Simulation Model” 
The resulting figures for our “reference simulation model” are shown in Table 5-1. The refer-
ence simulation model is characterised by housing costs incurred up to the estimated maxi-
mum threshold, considering the maximum information available on income deductions and 
also performing a wealth test. Also, the reference model includes the aforementioned correc-
tions. We believe that this model is appropriate to our data, that is, it can be interpreted as a 
“best guess”. However, in order to provide sensitivity analyses for the decisions underlying 
the reference model, we present estimates of non-take-up rates also based on a series of varia-
tions of the simulation model in the next section. 
Table 5-1: 
Descriptive Results (“Reference Simulation Model”) 
     n (observed) N (weighted) 
in 1.000
in % of 
total HH 
1.  Total number of private households   12,584 38,720 100.00 
2.  Eligible for HLU  515 2,187 5.65 
3.  thereof: with HLU receipt  189 719 1.86 
4.               without HLU receipt  326 1,468 3.79 
5.  HLU receipt although not eligible (“beta error”)  36 104 0.27 
Æ Non-Take-Up Rate (4. / (3.+4.)):    67.1%  confidence interval: 63.3% - 73.2% 
Æ Beta Error Rate      (5. / (3.+5.)):   12.6%  confidence interval: 9.6% - 14.7% 
Note: 93%-Confidence intervals are calculated on the basis of a random-group approach (see Rendtel et al. 1995).   
Source: SOEP 2002 
The rate of non-take-up of SA is defined by the ratio of all eligible households that do not 
report receipt of SA and the total number of eligible households (take-up and non-take-up 
households together). The estimated rate of non-take-up of SA in Germany for the year 2002 
amounts to as much as 67%. In addition to the point estimate, we also computed confidence 
intervals ranging from 63% to 73%. Compared to previous studies, this figure is located at the 5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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upper bound of estimates of non-take-up in Germany (see section 3.1). This seems quite sur-
prising given that the simulation model applied here includes a detailed wealth test, which 
should yield significantly lower non-take-up rates. The general expectation with regard to 
trends in non-take-up would, if anything, point towards a declining trend in non-take-up.10 
The point estimate for the beta-error rate, defined as the ratio of ineligible households that 
report receiving SA and all eligible households, is quite low in our reference model, amount-
ing to 12.6% within a confidence interval ranging from 10% to 15%. Although the beta-error 
rate should be regarded as an important and sensitive indicator for the quality and fit of the 
simulation model, so far it has rarely been reported separately, and even less frequently dis-
cussed in depth (see e.g. Becker/Hauser 2005: 70 and 101ff.).  
Table 5-2 shows the high degree of accordance of needs, housing costs and income in our 
SOEP-based simulation with the “true” information available from the official statistics.  For 
SOEP-households that we simulated as eligible and that reported  SA take-up (“Take-Up”), 
the simulated needs match the official information perfectly, while housing costs appear to be 
slightly overestimated. Allowable incomes, on average, are very close resulting in simulated 
entitlements of €464 which is about €50 higher than the corresponding reference measure. 
Unsurprisingly, eligible households without take-up (“Non-Take-Up”) on average show 
slightly less needs (and housing costs) than those who do take up SA, while allowable in-
comes are significantly higher, resulting in accordingly smaller entitlements.11  
Finally, the group of “Beta Error” households exhibits by far the highest needs of all groups 
on average. At the same time, this group’s income is much higher than that of all households 
simulated as eligible. This may point to the aforementioned problem of correctly identifying 
needs units within households. The combination of high needs and high allowable income 
gives some indication for beta error households often comprising several needs units. On the 
one hand, high needs at the household level may reflect that there are several needs units 
within the household, some of them being in severe need and consequently taking up SA. On 
the other hand, the high household income may result from a relatively “rich” needs unit liv-
                                                                          
10 Moreover, first simulation models of non-take-up of SA for the preceding and subsequent years 2001 and 2003 
also show a high and rather stable level of non-take-up.  
11 Despite the quality of the simulation of needs and income at the micro level, there is a clear under-reporting of 
the overall share of SA recipients based on SOEP as compared to official statistics (see also Table 4.1 above). 5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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ing in that very same household, rendering the household as a whole ineligible for the simula-
tion process.12     
Table 5-2: 















  averaged amount per household, in € 
Simulated households (SOEP)   
  Ineligible  533 277 2240 -1403  36 728 912
  Beta Error  767 344 1677 -543   104 739
  Non-Take-Up  528 363 702 218  1 476 205
  Take-Up  578 370 494 464   723 506
Official Statistics: regular SA   
  Needs Units (All)  549 293 446 396  1 442 753
  Needs Units with  
  Head of Household    573   313   473   413  1 256 385
Source: SOEP 2002; StaBuA 2003, Tab. A.2.6.1 
5.2  How to Evaluate the Quality of Simulation Models? – Variations 
of the “Reference Simulation Model” 
Unless external data are available, it seems difficult to evaluate the quality of a given simula-
tion model. However, the beta error rate may serve as an indicator of the quality of the simu-
lation model, at least in combination with the corresponding variation in non-take-up rates. In 
principle, large beta errors may be seen as indication for the simulation model being too “re-
strictive”, whereas high rates of non-take-up may indicate the opposite result of a too “gener-
ous” simulation of eligibility, at least if compared to lower non-take-up rates resulting from 
other simulation models. Thus, considering the joint variation in both beta error rates and non-
take-up rates across several modifications of the simulation model provides us with a baseline 
for evaluating the quality of a given simulation model.  
Table 5.3 presents comparative results for a number of variations in the reference simulation 
model (no. 9) in order to analyse the impact of the decisions underlying the reference simula-
tion model on the estimated non-take-up rates. As already mentioned in Section 4 above, the 
                                                                          
12 A closer investigation of the number of potential needs units within SOEP households showed that beta error 
households comprise more than one needs unit in at least 30% of all cases, whereas this rate is about 10% for all 
households (confirming the results reported by Becker/Hauser 2005: 243ff. based on EVS data), but particularly 
lower (4%) for households simulated as eligible and reporting SA receipt. However, it is not possible to properly 
allocate the information on SA receipt as well as on income to the various needs units given that this information 
is only available at the aggregated level of the surveyed household (due to the fact that SA receipt and household 
income are surveyed in the household questionnaire to be filled in by the head). 5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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most important and problematic decisions to be made concern housing costs, the wealth check 
and the definition of allowable incomes. As already discussed in section 3.4, there are three 
alternatives for dealing with housing costs, whereas the alternative for the reference model 
(incurring housing costs up to the estimated maximum threshold) lies in between the two 
extreme alternatives of incurring all housing costs and excluding households with housing 
costs exceeding the maximum eligibility threshold. With respect to the definition of allowable 
incomes, we had to decide between considering only the standard set of income deductions or 
to also include approximated additional deductions. For our reference model, we opted for the 
full deductions, and we also decided to simulate a wealth test instead of ignoring it. 
Table 5-3: 
Variations of Simulation Models 
--- before corrections ---  --- after corrections --- 
No. Housing  costs  Wealth 
check 
Allowable 
incomes  Non-take up  Beta error  Non-take up  Beta error 
1.  all conceded  no  restricted deduct.  0.778  0.190  0.751  0.138 
2.  conceded up to maximum  no  restricted deduct.  0.759  0.192  0.730  0.138 
3.  Ineligible if HC>maximum  no  restricted deduct.  0.742  0.356  0.665  0.140 
4.  conceded up to maximum  yes  restricted deduct.  0.709  0.237  0.662  0.139 
5.  Ineligible if HC>maximum  yes  restricted deduct.  0.678  0.380  0.581  0.140 
6.  all conceded  no  full deductions  0.788  0.189  0.759  0.126 
7.  conceded up to maximum  no  full deductions  0.770  0.191  0.738  0.126 
8.  Ineligible if HC>maximum  no  full deductions  0.754  0.355  0.676  0.128 
9.  conceded up to maximum  yes  full deductions  0.721  0.236  0.671  0.126 
10.  Ineligible if HC>maximum  yes  full deductions  0.693  0.378  0.594  0.128 
Source: SOEP 2002 
The resulting non-take-up and beta error rates for the various modifications of the simulation 
model are shown before and after the “post-simulation corrections” as described in section 
4.6. Of course, after correcting for beta errors, they become very similar across the various 
modifications of the simulation models. The only remaining source of variation comes from 
the definition of allowable income. 
The results in Table 5-3 are also shown in graphical form in Figure 5-4, where the simulation 
models are ordered according to the incidence of beta errors. As can be seen, the four models 
with the lowest beta error rates also show by far the highest non-take-up rates, in particular 
after corrections. Thus, it can be argued that these four simulation models overestimate needs 
and/or underestimate the economic resources of the households. Not surprisingly, these mod-
els (no. 6, 1, 7 and 2) do not entail the wealth check and deal rather generously with high 
housing costs. For models 9 and 4, we observe a slight increase in beta error rates, but a con-
siderable decline in non-take-up rates. Most important, the remaining models, if compared to 5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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models 9 and 4, show a strong increase in the beta error rates, although the non-take-up rates 
even increase in models 8 and 3, and only slightly decrease in models 10 and 5. In other 
words, models 8, 3, 10 and 5 appear not only restrictive but misleading in defining eligibility, 
since the increase in the beta error rates – indicating restrictive simulations – are not accom-
panied by the corresponding decrease in non-take-up rates that we would have expected from 
the general trade-off between beta error rates and non-take-up rates. This is due to the com-
mon feature of these four models in excluding households with housing costs exceeding the 
maximum thresholds from eligibility.  
Figure 5-4: 
Non-Take-Up and Beta Error Rates for Various Simulation Models 
Source: SOEP 2002 
This pattern provides a solid guideline to “internally” evaluate the quality of the simulation 
models, at least compared to each other. Models 9 and 4 seem to perform best, given that beta 
error rates as well as non-take-up rates are still quite low. In greater detail, simulation models 
assuming housing costs to be incurred up to the maximum thresholds perform better than 
models considering total housing costs as needs as well as those models rejecting eligibility if 
housing costs exceed maximum thresholds. Last but not least – and unsurprisingly – all simu-
lation models that include a simulated wealth check perform better than those without.  
With respect to the definition of allowable income, differences between simulation models 
with restrictive vs. generous income allowances seem only to be modest, and in line with the 
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the reference simulation model is mainly based on the result of lower beta errors after the 
post-simulation corrections. 
Furthermore, what we have learned about the effects of the post simulation corrections is, 
first, that differences in beta-error rates across simulation models are completely cancelled 
out, with the only exception of persistent, but rather small differences due to the definition of 
allowable income. However, this difference is now slightly larger than it was prior to these 
corrections. Second, the differences in non-take-up rates across models are now even more 
marked, with the surprising exception of diminishing differences between models 9 and 8. 
5.3  Measurement Error in Income and Needs 
Rates of non-take-up vary considerably according to the specification of the simulation model 
and the extent of post-simulation corrections. The final corrections already attempt to capture 
measurement errors, especially with respect to wealth, income and the receipt of SA. In this 
section, the impact of measurement error in income and needs will be addressed in more de-
tail. 
In a first step, the impact of flat-rate variations in the measures of income, needs and housing 
costs is analysed. Thus, assuming that income as well as housing costs and needs are gener-
ally measured too high or too low in terms of a certain rate of deviation from the “true” in-
come, we calculate the impact of these deviations on non-take-up rates and beta error rates. 
The observed needs and income are assumed to represent “true” needs and income, respec-
tively, in this counterfactual exercise.  
Results reported in Table 5.5 show that non-take-up rates as well as beta error rates are less 
sensitive to measurement errors in housing costs and most sensitive to variations in income. 
Thus, potential measurement errors in income measures will have the strongest impact on the 
estimated rates. This is important since measurements errors are at the same time most likely 
to occur in income measures, rather than in measures of needs, which appear to be rather 
straightforward to simulate. However, housing costs, which are also highly affected by meas-
urement problems, will not cause serious problems in the estimation of non-take-up. 
Furthermore, the impact of measurement errors on non-take-up rates is almost the same for 
initial simulation results as well as for corrected results. In other words, the corrections em-
ployed after the simulation process do not already correct for measurement error. However, 5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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for beta error rates, we find that the corrections also affect the sensitivity to measurement 
error. Variations in the underlying measures have a stronger impact on the corrected results of 
beta errors than on initial results.  
Table 5-5: 
Non-Take-Up and Beta Error Rates for Flat Variations in Needs and Incomes 
     -15%  -5%  Ref +5%  +15%  range 
Needs 0.662  0.701  0.721 0.736 0.765 0.103 
Housing 0.683 0.713 0.721 0.729 0.743 0.060 
before 
corrections 
Income (-)  0.624  0.688  0.721 0.754 0.801 0.177 
Needs 0.614  0.662  0.671 0.689 0.719 0.106 





Income (-)  0.580  0.647  0.671 0.707 0.761 0.180 
Needs 0.276  0.236  0.236 0.224 0.195 0.081 
Housing 0.254 0.236 0.236 0.226 0.212 0.042 
before 
corrections 
Income (-)  0.281  0.256  0.236 0.212 0.168 0.113 
Needs 0.190  0.166  0.126 0.116 0.087 0.103 





Income (-)  0.219  0.180  0.126 0.106 0.060 0.159 
Source: SOEP 2002 
In a next step, we assume random or “classical” measurement error. Again, taking the ob-
served measures as “true” measures, we now apply a random variation to our measures of 
needs, housing costs and income separately, and also to all three components simultaneously, 
but assuming independent errors. The error is specified by means of a deviation factor of the 
“true” measure that is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 0.1. We 
draw 500 random errors for each of the three measures and also 500 sets of independent errors 
for the three components simultaneously. The resulting distributions of non-take-up rates and 
corresponding beta error rates – again, before and after the post-simulation corrections – are 
shown in graphical form in figures 5.6a-d. 
Again, a clear picture appears with respect to the different degree of sensitivity of non-take-up 
rates to measures of needs, housing costs and income. Whereas a random variation in housing 
costs does not affect the resulting level of non-take-up rates much, the variation in incomes 
shows a strong impact. Most striking is the result that the non-take-up rates based on errone-
ous income measures are substantially higher than non-take-up rates based on “true” incomes. 
This can be explained by two factors, one rooted in the nature of the applied error, and one 
rooted in the income distribution. Given that we apply an error term as a percentage deviation 
from true incomes, the absolute amount of this error will be larger for higher incomes and 
smaller for lower incomes. Subtracting 10% from an income of, say, 1000 yields an income of 5 Descriptive Results: Non-Take-Up and Measurement Error 
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900, whereas adding 10% to an income of 900 yields 990. In other words, even if income was 
equally distributed around the needs threshold, we would be making more households eligible 
than ineligible. In fact, the second main reason for the observed result is that income is in fact 
not equally distributed around the needs thresholds. There are more households just above the 
needs threshold than there are just below it. This also reinforces the outcome that, after apply-
ing the random error, more households will become eligible than the other way around, result-
ing in a sharp increase in eligibility and, subsequently, in non-take-up rates (given that the 
majority of these households do not report SA receipt). 
Figure 5-6: 
Non-Take-Up and Beta Error Rates Assuming Random Error 
Source: SOEP 2002. Dotted constants indicate the according results of the “reference” model, based on observed values. 
To sum up, the Monte-Carlo like simulations of the effects of random error on estimated non-
take-up rates clearly shows that classical measurement error results in an overestimation of 
non-take-up as well as beta error rates. Thus, even if we had a perfect simulation model of 
eligibility, measurement error in our data would result in biased estimates of non-take-up. The 
open question remains whether and how one should correct for this bias in estimating non-
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6  Correlates of Non-Take-Up of SA: Regression Analyses 
Given that non-take-up of SA seems to be widespread among the population that – according 
to our simulation – is eligible for SA, it is of utmost importance to identify observable charac-
teristics that are related to the claiming behaviour, and whether it is possible to detect the 
mechanisms driving the non-take-up decision. When non-take-up of SA was first addressed in 
Germany in the early 1980s, most researchers related this phenomenon to the elderly, espe-
cially elderly women, and argued that the main causes for non-take-up were shame and fear of 
stigmatisation as well as informational deficits about their eligibility and the fear of relatives 
being made responsible for financial support.  
Recent research on non-take-up paints a somewhat different picture. These studies have high-
lighted the fact that most non-take-up households are entitled to claim rather small amounts, 
which might not be sufficient to compensate for the costs of claiming in the eyes of many 
households. Turning to a dynamic perspective, this should be the case particularly for those 
who expect their economic situation to improve in the very near future. This kind of “ra-
tional” non-take-up behaviour may already explain the lion’s share of non-take-up and may 
be seen as less severe a problem from a social policy perspective in contrast to prior explana-
tions of this behaviour as being driven mainly by fear, stigma and ignorance. On the other 
hand, the recent literature has also stressed the relevance of factors at the level of social ad-
ministration such as insufficient information policies and humiliating treatment of clients, and 
barriers to take-up inherent to the scheme itself, such as its complexity and intimacy. If this 
were the case, it would again move the responsibilities for large non-take-up rates to the insti-
tutional area, i.e., social policy. Of course, such barriers to take-up the level of social admini-
stration and benefit schemes are hard to identify at the micro level of individual households.  
Furthermore, in recent times, social policy has emphasized the responsibility of individuals to 
attain independence from social transfers and has attempted to strengthen their capacity for 
self-sufficiency by promoting labour force participation and workfare policies. The underly-
ing assumption is often that recipients of SA and other social benefits tend to rely on SA 
rather than looking for work.  
In this section we try to address the issue of the potential determinants of non-take-up of SA 
by means of multivariate analysis. We start from a rather simple specification of non-take-up 
employing a set of covariates that serve as proxies for the utility derived from SA and the 6 Correlates of Non-Take-Up of SA: Regression Analyses 
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costs of claiming it before extending this model by introducing aggregated information on SA 
receipt at the regional level, on the one hand, and by controlling for selection into the stage of 
eligibility by means of a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979). 
6.1  Model Specification: Approximating Needs and Costs of 
Claiming SA 
Building on the existing literature, we estimate a simple probability model of non-take-up of 
SA as a starting point for our multivariate regression analysis (see formula 1, page 12). As 
independent variables, we include a set of proxy variables aiming to capture the utility from 
claiming, which depends on the amount of the expected benefit as a function of the degree of 
needs and the expected duration of staying in need. A second set of variables serves as proxy 
information for all kinds of costs related to claiming benefits, such as informational costs, 
stigma costs, or barriers arising from negative attitudes towards social security benefits. In a 
second step, we extend this simple probability model in two ways. First, we address the po-
tential selectivity of being eligible and claiming for SA due to low motivation to work by 
means of a Heckman selection model. Second, we also include external aggregated informa-
tion on the population share of SA recipients at the regional level13 as an independent variable 
in order to capture at least some of the relevant processes at the level of the SA agency. 
Above and beyond this institutional control issue, one may also argue that stigmatisation 
poses less of a problem for an individual in a given community if there is an above-average 
level of SA receipt there. In other words, “it is easier for me to claim SA if there are more 
people around me also claiming SA”.  
Table 6.1 gives an overview on the right-hand side variables used in the regression models as 
proxies on utility and costs of claiming (see also Becker/Hauser 2005: 146 and Riphahn 2001: 
392f.). The utility from claiming SA is represented in our model by the amount of SA that a 
household is eligible for according to our simulation. Given that the total amount of SA will 
be different in value for households of different sizes, we normalize this information for use 
as a RHS-variable by means of division of this simulated entitlement by the overall “need”. 
This variable is referred to as a “relative poverty gap” (interpreting the needs threshold as a 
poverty line) and by definition, it ranges from 0 to 100 percent. 
                                                                          
13 Information is given as the share of the population receiving HLU in the county the household resides in 
(StaBuA: Statistik regional. Ausgabe, 2006).   6 Correlates of Non-Take-Up of SA: Regression Analyses 
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Table 6-1: 
Proxies of Utility and Costs of Claiming and their Assumed Relationship  
  Utility from SA:  Claiming Costs: 








Relative poverty gap (continuous)  +       
Single parents            (Ref: hh w/o children)  +  +  -  - 
Family with children (Ref: hh w/o children)  +      + 
Number of children (cont.)  +  +     
Person in need of care in HH  +  +     
Disability of household head  +  +  -  - 
Young household   (Ref: middle age HH)    -    - 
Pensioner household (Ref: middle age HH)    +  +  + 
High education (Ref: intermediate education)    -  -   
Low education  (Ref: intermediate education)    +  +   
Sex of household head (male)        + 
Migration background (household head)      +  + 
Rural area              (Ref: intermediate area)  -    +  + 
Metropolitan area (Ref: intermediate area)      -  - 
East Germany      +   
Negative attitudes towards social security  -      + 
 
Besides the utility expressed in monetary terms, a set of additional variables indicates the 
urgency and degree of need as well as its expected duration. We assume that single parents 
and households with children or persons in need of care are in more urgent need of help than 
other households, given that there are “dependent” persons within the household for whom 
the head of household is responsible. Households headed by a disabled person are also as-
sumed to be in greater need. All these variables also indicate a longer duration of need and 
thus eligibility for SA, since the presence of dependent persons in the household as well as 
disability of the household head will lower labour market chances and participation. The sta-
bility of the living conditions (and thus eligibility) is also assumed to depend on the current 
stage of the family cycle as well as on educational level of the household head. We expect 
that “young” households face higher instabilities in their living conditions, so that claiming 
SA might not pay off in a long-term perspective, whereas the opposite is true for pensioner 
households. Labour market chances are also approximated based on the education level of the 
household head. 
Indeed, some of the aforementioned variables may serve not only as proxies of needs, but for 
claiming costs as well. In some cases, this will even strengthen the expected overall impact on 
non-take-up behaviour, but in others, both effects may point in very different directions, so 
that the overall effect on non-take-up behaviour becomes difficult to hypothesise. For single 
parents and for disability of the household head, we assume that both information costs and 6 Correlates of Non-Take-Up of SA: Regression Analyses 
 36
stigma costs are lower, given that those households are commonly regarded as relying on 
outside support. In contrast, for families with children, we assume higher stigma costs due to 
social norms of self-sufficiency and parents’ responsibility for the economic security of their 
offspring. As such, one can assume that the net effect is rather small given that higher needs 
induced by the children on the one hand and higher costs of claiming (due to stigma) on the 
other hand might cancel out each other. However, with the number of children rising, the 
additional needs will exceed the effect of stigma costs.  
Contradicting effects on needs versus costs can also be expected with respect to education and 
age of the household head. Low-educated household heads might expect longer durations of 
needs, but at the same time information costs are higher, whereas more highly educated 
household heads will find it easy to apply for SA, but at the same time might also expect to 
increase labour income in the near future, thus experiencing only a short episode of SA de-
pendency. Households with young heads, which often face rapid changes in their living con-
ditions, will also face lower stigma costs in a situation of need, given the transitory stage 
within the life course or family cycle. On the other hand, for the elderly, previous studies have 
frequently reported high non-take-up rates mostly due to ignorance, fears and stigma aversion. 
However, one can expect these effects to level off with longer-lasting periods of eligibility.  
A final set of covariates is used to approximate information and stigma costs only. These are 
assumed to be higher for male household heads (social norms), for immigrants (ignorance and 
fear of stigmatisation), households living in small towns or rural areas (higher social control) 
and for household heads that report negative attitudes towards social security. Moreover, 
households living in rural areas might also rely on home production (e.g., growing fruits and 
vegetables on their plot) and mobilise social networks in situation of needs, lowering the 
utility from claiming SA. This might also be the case for household heads with strongly nega-
tive attitudes toward the welfare state’s social security system.14 
6.2 Estimation  Results: Simple Probit Model 
Estimation results for the simple probit model – together with those of the other two models –
are reported in Table 6.2. The simple probit model (1) is based on the population of all house-
holds deemed eligible for SA in our simulation (n=515) and the dependent variable is “non-6 Correlates of Non-Take-Up of SA: Regression Analyses 
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take-up” of SA. The estimation contains the aforementioned variables as proxies for needs 
and or costs of claiming. We find highly significant effects for several needs indicators. First 
of all, relative poverty has a strongly negative impact on non-take-up of SA. Households with 
needs of nearly 100 percent of their respective needs threshold (or “poverty line”), e.g. for 
households without own income, the estimated probability of non-take-up is only 90 percent 
of the level for households with a relative poverty gap of nearly zero percent, e.g. households 
that are just below their needs threshold (see the column with “marginal effects” for model 1). 
Moreover, we find highly significant effects for our measures of the degree and expected 
duration of need. Households or needs units with a disabled household head, those with per-
sons in need of care, as well as those with two or more children all show a lower non-take-up 
rate. Although the main effect for families with children is positive and significant, the results 
controlling for the number of children living in the household indicate that each additional 
child reduces the probability of non-take-up by about 17 percent. After controlling for the 
effect of children, we still find an additional negative effect for single parents, although it is 
not statistically significant. 
We find no significant effects for the household head’s age or educational level. As laid out 
above, we expect this finding to result from contradicting effects on the expected duration of 
the need situation and on stigma and application costs, so that significant net effects in either 
direction are less likely. With respect to the magnitude of the estimated effects, we find a 
positive tendency for pensioners as well as for low-educated household heads to take up SA. 
This might be interpreted in terms of the expected longer durations of needs paying off the 
assumed higher information and application costs. However, especially with regard to the 
pensioners, it may also indicate that stigma costs have decreased somewhat in the past dec-
ades, compared to what the literature tells us about the fears and barriers of the elderly in 
claiming SA.  
While the estimated effects for the “needs” proxies by and large confirm our hypothesis, the 
estimation results for our cost proxies perform rather differently. The only statistically signifi-
cant effect we find is the expected negative effect for living in a metropolitan area. All other 
effects are basically close to zero. Although not significant, the effect for living in a small 
community is also negative, as is the effect for living in East Germany. Based on previous 
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studies, we expected positive effects due to higher stigma and higher information costs, re-
spectively. However, our findings suggest that for East Germany, the original “GDR” effect 
may have run out, i.e., East Germans may by now understand the (West German) SA system 
very well. Above and beyond this interpretation, one should also keep in mind that the under-
lying (eligible) population has changed due to selective migration from East to West Germany 
since unification. Finally, in light of all the other controls, the variable indicating negative 
attitudes towards social security shows no relevant effect at all on non-take-up behaviour. 
Table 6-2: 
Estimation Results: Correlates of Non-Take-Up of SA 
  Model 1: Simple Probit Model 2: Extended Probit Model 3: Heckman Selection 
 non-take-up  non-take-up  non-take-up  eligibility 
 Characteristics of HH (Head)  beta    SE  mfx  beta   SE  mfx  beta    SE  beta    SE 
relative poverty gap (cont.)  -0,026*** 0,003 -0,009 -0,023*** 0,003 -0,008 -0,021 ***  0,004    
single parents         (Ref: hh w/o children)  -0,205  0,217 -0,076 -0,240  0,216 -0,088 0,016   0,254  0,644*** 0,090
family with children (Ref: hh w/o children)  0,589** 0,268 0,195 0,551**  0,269 0,179 0,414   0,274  -0,226** 0,108
no. of children (cont.)  -0,451*** 0,093 -0,165 -0,467*** 0,102 -0,168 -0,328 **  0,129 0,304*** 0,042
person in need of care in hh  -0,765** 0,313 -0,297 -0,599*  0,311 -0,231 -0,478   0,299  0,089  0,123
disability  -0,393*  0,202 -0,150 -0,312 0,201 -0,117 -0,238    0,198  0,096  0,078
young household        (Ref: adult hh)  -0,052  0,213 -0,019 0,045  0,205 0,016 0,221   0,226  0,495*** 0,101
pensioner household  (Ref: adult hh)  -0,310  0,199 -0,117 -1,312*** 0,358 -0,488 -0,972 **  0,408 0,438*** 0,086
high education  (Ref: intermediate)  -0,157  0,150 -0,058 -0,119  0,141 -0,043 0,038   0,168  0,377*** 0,065
low education   (Ref: intermediate)  -0,350  0,263 -0,134 -0,380  0,317 -0,144 -0,525 **  0,261 -0,236*** 0,091
male 0,054  0,162 0,020 0,033  0,151 0,012 -0,035    0,157  -0,147** 0,058
migration background  -0,001  0,160 -0,001 0,013  0,160 0,005 0,247   0,191  0,584*** 0,065
rural area             (Ref: intermediate area)  -0,124  0,197 -0,046 -0,293  0,232 -0,109 -0,360 *  0,195 -0,271*** 0,079
metropolitan area (Ref: intermediate area)  -0,413** 0,171 -0,157 -0,058 0,214 -0,021 -0,034    0,197  0,050  0,086
East Germany  -0,219  0,175 -0,082 -0,149  0,171 -0,055 -0,101   0,174  0,091  0,071
negative attitudes towards social security  -0,093  0,260 -0,034 -0,050  0,289 -0,018 -0,017   0,247  0,043  0,103
part-time working      (Ref: fulltime work-
ing) 
     -0,805**  0,356 -0,306 -0,259   0,451  1,085
***
0,090
unemployed (ILO)   (Ref: fulltime working)        -1,155*** 0,345 -0,433 -0,375   0,561  1,652*** 0,095
not working              (Ref: fulltime working)        -1,326*** 0,329 -0,487 -0,597   0,539  1,471*** 0,086
self employed          (Ref: fulltime working)        -0,644  0,579 -0,249 -0,471   0,525  0,381*** 0,136
second job        0,347  0,419 0,113 0,137   0,389  -0,451*** 0,145
regional SA ratio        -0,127*** 0,043 -0,046 -0,102 **  0,043 0,036** 0,016
PC without internet   (Ref: no PC)                   -0,293*** 0,073
PC with internet        (Ref: no PC)                   -0,695*** 0,077
Constant  1,811*** 0,205   3,146*** 0,375  1,401    1,123  -2,529*** 0,104
Observations 515  515  12548 
Pseudo R-squared  0,252  0,304        
rho (LR-Test rho=0)           rho=0,503  p=0,128 
Source: SOEP 2002 
6.3  Extending the Simple Probit Model 
By and large, the results of the simple probit model confirm the results of previous studies on 
the correlates of non-take-up. In the following, we add to the existing literature by extending 
the simple probit model. On the one hand, we seek to further examine the role of information 
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and stigma costs by means of introducing regional information on the share of SA recipients. 
Regional concentration of SA recipients of course also indicates lower income chances and 
higher degrees of need at an aggregated level. Indeed, given that we measure the needs situa-
tion of the households at the micro level of individual households quite well, the introduction 
of this variable should have a particular impact on the effects of our stigma and information 
cost measures. We assume that a higher dispersion of SA receipt among the regional popula-
tion will lower the stigma as well as information costs for any individual household in this 
region. Thus, we expect that the effect of community size will diminish once regional SA 
ratios are controlled for.  
Assessing the estimation results for model 2, we find – as expected – that considering infor-
mation about local SA receipt reduces the effect of living in a metropolitan area. The effect is 
now close to zero, whereas a strong effect is found for the regional SA ratio. An increase in 
the SA ratio of about two percentage points yields a decrease of the non-take-up probability 
of about 10 percent. For all other variables, we do not find any relevant change due to the 
introduction of regional SA ratios. 
Most important, model 2 also includes information on current employment status of the 
household head.15 So far, the regression models ignored the discussion about work incentives 
and social benefits that have motivated workfare reforms in many European and non-
European countries. The underlying assumption of many of these reforms is that households 
may refrain from searching for (low-paid) jobs and rely on social benefits instead. Conse-
quently, take-up households will differ from non-take-up household with respect to labour 
force participation: i.e., take-up households should show stronger orientation towards work. 
This is in fact what we find by entering employment status in the regression model. The effect 
of pensioner households now becomes strongly significant, because the reference category 
changes to fulltime employment rather than the middle age cohorts.  
Of course, the strong and significant effect of employment status might also operate through 
its impact on the expected utility and the costs of claiming, rather than reflecting solely the 
impact of work orientations. At the same time, employment status is also an important predic-
tor for becoming eligible for SA, e.g., in the case of long-term unemployment once the person 
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is no longer eligible for benefits from the upstream unemployment insurance system. More 
generally, in assessing non-take-up behaviour conditional on eligibility we effectively select 
on the impact of the same set of variables. For this reason, in model (3) we apply a Heckman 
type selection model based on the full sample (n=12,548 households) and the full set of ex-
planatory variables.16 Most of the variables included show a strong and significant effect on 
the sample selection into eligibility, although the overall correlation between the error terms 
of both equations (rho) just falls short of significance. Controlling for sample selection, we 
find substantial changes in the coefficients of the variables as compared to the previous esti-
mations. We observe a weakening in the effects of some of the proxy variables of the ex-
pected utility from claiming SA (family, children, disability and care), whereas other vari-
ables turn to show a significant impact: Low education and living in a rural area now show 
significant negative effects on non-take-up, while younger households and those with a mi-
gration background now show the expected positive impact on non-take-up, although coeffi-
cients are not significant. Most strikingly, the effects on employment status lose significance, 
although the coefficients are still large in size. Thus, after controlling for the fact that all eli-
gible households share an employment profile different from ineligible households, the net 
effect of, e.g., unemployment is substantially smaller than before.17 Last but not least, house-
holds living in regions with high SA receipt are found to be significantly more likely to claim 
SA, as this is what they see around them. At the same time these households also show a 
higher risk of being eligible for SA due to the weak economic environment.  
7  Concluding Remarks  
In this paper we estimate the degree of non-take-up of SA in Germany in 2002, and analyse 
potential determinants of non-take-up behaviour. We find non-take-up of SA to be extremely 
widespread, with a rate of 67% of all (simulated) eligible households not receiving SA ac-
cording to self-reported information in the underlying survey data of the German SOEP. 
                                                                          
16 To identify the selection process, we added two variables indicating the access to a personal computer and 
Internet. The variable “relative poverty gap” was dropped, of course, from the selection equation because it per-
fectly predicts eligibility. 
17 Of course, this still may not account properly for potential endogeneity problems. For example, if an unem-
ployed household head chooses to refrain from working (e.g., in a low-paid job) and prefers instead to claim SA, 
the impact of unemployment on non-take-up will be overestimated. See Wilde/Kubis 2005 for an alternative 
approach by simultaneously estimating labour force participation and take-up behaviour.  
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Compared to previous studies, it seems like non-take-up of SA has increased in recent times 
in line with the overall increase in poverty and SA receipt in Germany since the mid 1970s. 
However, consistent time series analyses on non-take-up of SA are not available for Ger-
many, and thus any inference on trends remain uncertain due to comparability problems 
across different studies.  
Concerning the simulation of eligibility and the identification of non-take-up households, 
emphasis is given to the role of measurement error. We show how the rate of “beta errors” – 
e.g., households reporting SA receipt although being simulated as not eligible – may be used 
as an internal indicator for the quality of the simulation model, and how much the modifica-
tion of several parameters of the simulation model affects estimated non-take-up rates. In 
addition to the important impact of considering a wealth test in the simulation process, also 
the way in which housing costs are considered plays a crucial role. Moreover, in identifying 
non-take-up households based on the eligibility criterion derived from our simulation, the 
information on actual SA receipt given by respondents is another source of potential misclas-
sification. 
Clear evidence can be provided with respect to the important role of measurement error in the 
survey information on income, housing costs, and needs. As expected, measurement errors in 
income are most important, clearly dominating the overall effects of simultaneous measure-
ment errors in all relevant survey information. In principle, the effect of an assumed random 
error in income on the estimated non-take-up rates is an overestimation of non-take-up. This 
result is mainly driven by the fact that introducing randomly distributed measurement errors 
in the lower part of the income distribution – thus around the eligibility threshold – will push 
more households below the eligibility thresholds than the other way around, given the skewed 
distributional form at the lower tail of the income distribution and the fact that a proportional 
error factor results in larger total amounts of the error in the upper parts of the distribution. 
However, unless we lack exact information on the distribution of measurement errors in the 
lower part of the income distribution, we should be cautious in interpreting the results that 
were obtained from applying simply random or “classical” measurement errors. 
Regression analysis on non-take-up confirms the results of previous studies and our expecta-
tions about the relevance of the expected utility of claiming SA as well as the information and 
stigma costs associated with this process. We find clear evidence that non-take-up of SA is 
higher for lower degrees of need and in case of more optimistic prospects on leaving the state 7 Concluding Remarks 
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of eligibility for SA fairly soon. Keeping in mind our results on the impact of measurement 
error, especially the sensitivity of estimated non-take-up rates to incomes just around the 
eligibility threshold, we may conclude that a substantial part of the puzzling picture of non-
take-up can be explained by “rational poverty” (Riphahn 2001). In other words for households 
(just) below the eligibility threshold, the costs of claiming do not pay off the utility they can 
expect from claiming, at least not in the short run.  
Thinking further along these lines and keeping in mind the recent increase in poverty and 
income inequality in Germany (see, e.g., Frick et al 2005) may also help understand our rather 
high estimates for non-take-up in 2002 as compared to those found in previous studies. The 
secular trend of increasing income poverty may lead to an increase not only in the observed 
rates of SA recipients, but even more so to a pronounced increase in (temporarily) eligible 
households or households on the edge of eligibility, thus resulting in an increase in the non-
take-up rate as well. As a matter of endogeneity, measures of relative income poverty may 
have been increased due to eligible households forgiving their SA entitlements.  
Indeed, even if this hypothetical scenario might explain the change in non-take-up rates, the 
high level of non-take-up observed in Germany throughout the past decades as such still re-
mains a puzzle. The proxy information available in surveys to indicate information and stigma 
costs seems insufficient to detect the mechanism driving non-take-up behaviour. Although we 
employ a wide range of proxies including attitudes towards social security, the regression 
results on non-take-up are rather disappointing. However, enhancing the estimations by add-
ing aggregated regional information on SA ratios has allowed us to validate the stigma-
reducing effects of living in an area with high SA dependency. 
Correcting for potential sample selection according to Heckman (1979) indicates that the 
impact of our proxies for utility is slightly overestimated and also masks the impact of other 
variables. We did not account in detail for endogeneity problems that may arise from the 
interrelation between low working orientations and high affinity to take up social benefits. 
While this has been mentioned in the literature as a potential source for biased estimates (e.g., 
Wilde/Kubis 2005, Kayser/Frick 2001) it should be noted that strong work disincentives aris-
ing from generous social benefits may indeed be well suited to explain take-up behaviour, but 
not high levels of non-take-up of SA conditional on eligibility. 
Future work along these lines may include panel analyses exploiting the longitudinal nature of 
the micro-data at hand. The German SOEP also provides information on eligibility status and 7 Concluding Remarks 
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claiming behaviour in other years besides 2002. Especially the identification of otherwise 
unobservable individual and household characteristics (by means of random and fixed effects 
models) may help to further reduce the impact of measurement error which has been found to 
be of substantial importance.  
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